Rent-Seeking in the U.S. Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery

Abstract

Rent-seeking in the U.S. Atlantic sea scallop fishery is described. Resource and trade disputes caused the U.S. fishing industry, including scallopers, to lobby Congress for extended federal jurisdiction in 1977. The sea scallop fishery soon overcapitalized as fishermen captured non-exclusive resource rents. Limited entry was introduced in 1994, but an asymmetric distribution of potential wealth has blocked transferability of effort quotas as a means to eliminate excess fishing capital. Rent-seeking is now focused on transferability and a formative zoning policy that grants entitlements to marine resources, including marine protected areas which are advocated by environmental organizations. (Click here for paper)

Source: Edwards, S.F. 2000. “Rent-seeking in the U.S. Atlantic sea scallop fishery.” In: Proceedings of the Tenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade: Macrobehavior and Macroresults, July 10-14, 2000, Corvallis, Oregon. Corvallis, OR: International Institute for Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET).

For more information, please contact: Steve.Edwards@noaa.gov